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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an adaptation of the Tucker Lecture that I deliv-
ered in October of 2017. Its title depicts two iconic places, one in 
the Canadian province of Quebec, from where I hail, and the other 
in Louisiana, the locale of my audience. La Beauce, an enchanting 
part of Quebec, stretches along the Chaudière River and is located 
about thirty minutes south of Quebec City. Le Bayou refers to the 
low-lying wetlands found primarily in the southern part of Louisi-
ana, a defining feature of this part of the United States.  
 
 ∗  Professor and member of the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and 
Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University. This article is based on the 
40th John H. Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law that was delivered on October 19, 
2017 at the Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The style of 
an oral presentation has been intentionally preserved in some places. This lecture 
was adapted from the following paper: Rosalie Jukier, The Untapped Potential of 
Transsystemic Thinking, in REPENSER LES PARADIGMES: APPROCHES TRANS-
SYSTÉMIQUES DU DROIT 1 (Yaëll Emerich & Marie-Andrée Plante eds., 2018). 
The author wishes to thank McGill law student, Jenna Topan, generously funded 
by the Look-Chan and Law and You funds of the Faculty of Law, McGill Univer-
sity, for her invaluable assistance in helping me turn the lecture into a publishable 
format. 




In this paper, I attempt to guide an allegorical voyage from la 
Beauce to le Bayou, from Quebec to Louisiana, from Montreal to 
Baton Rouge, from McGill to LSU, using a transsystemic itinerary. 
This voyage will showcase the unique way of teaching and thinking 
about law that has defined the program of legal education, and the 
imaginations of legal scholars, at McGill’s Faculty of Law for al-
most two decades. In addition to demystifying the elusive term 
“transsystemic,” and outlining the pedagogical and intellectual 
benefits of teaching and thinking about law in this way, this paper 
will focus on the increasing relevance of the transsystemic approach 
as a way of preparing jurists, wherever they may be, for the com-
plexity and novelty of contemporary legal practice. By instilling cre-
ative, critical and flexible thinking skills, it enables jurists to deal 
with novel legal problems, to be more adept at envisaging a multi-
plicity of creative ways to solve legal problems through alternative 
methods of dispute resolution, and to keep pace with novel compar-
ative judicial methodology. 
Just as la Beauce and le Bayou are different places with different 
geographical features, so too are Quebec and Louisiana different 
legal jurisdictions. However, they are, in many ways, sister jurisdic-
tions, sharing a common mixity in their legal systems. This makes 
law schools in Louisiana a particularly fertile environment in which 
to showcase this unique itinerary in the hope that some of you will 
come along on this interesting voyage.  
 
Keywords: legal pedagogy; mixed jurisdictions; comparative law; 
Louisiana; transsystemic approach; Quebec 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It was with great pleasure, and even more humility, that, on Oc-
tober 19, 2017, I delivered the 40th John H. Tucker, jr. Lecture in 
Civil Law. The list of my predecessors who have delivered this pres-
tigious lecture was daunting indeed. If the reputation of the interna-
tional scholars who appear on that list was not intimidating enough, 
the fact that I personally knew all of the Quebec scholars who have 
spoken as Tucker lecturers was even more overwhelming as I was 




acutely aware of their singular accomplishments first-hand. I was 
privileged to know the late Paul-André Crépeau, who gave this lec-
ture in 1974, as my teacher and my colleague at McGill and as some-
one who contributed so greatly to Civil Code reform in Quebec, pre-
siding over the Civil Code Revision Office for twelve years. I am a 
great admirer of retired law professor and justice of the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, Jean-Louis Baudouin, the Tucker lecturer in the 
year 2000. Baudouin is, to us Quebeckers, le grand-père des obli-
gations, having written the definitive treatise on the Law of Obliga-
tions now in its seventh edition.1 And as for my friend and former 
colleague, Nicholas Kasirer, who was Dean of McGill’s Law Fac-
ulty (2003–2009), Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeal (2009–
2019) and now a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, after lis-
tening to his 2014 Tucker Lecture, I continue to marvel at his wit 
and creativity and, above all, his incredible insights into the law.2 It 
was a great honour to join the company of these, and all the other, 
previous lecturers and to have been added to this roster of impres-
sive jurists.  
In preparation for the Tucker Lecture, I did some research on its 
namesake, Colonel John H. Tucker, jr. What I learned was inspiring 
indeed. Apart from his work as Chair of the Louisiana State Law 
Institute, I learned that he was an incredibly well-respected legal 
scholar, having been called, in an article by Saul Litvinoff, a 
“scholar in action” and a “renaissance” figure.3 I believe that Pro-
fessor Yiannopolous may have given him the ultimate compliment 
by referring to him, in the title of an article, as a “jurisconsult.”4 
Reading some of Tucker’s own legal scholarship, one cannot help 
 
 1. JEAN LOUIS BAUDOUIN, et al., LES OBLIGATIONS (7th ed., Pierre-Gabriel 
Jobin; Nathalie V́ézina eds., Yvon Blais 2013). 
 2. Nicholas Kasirer, That Montreal Sound: The Influence of French Legal 
Ideas and the French Language on the Civil Law, Presentation for the John H. 
Tucker, jr. Lecture in Civil Law (Apr. 10, 2014). 
 3. Saul Litvinoff, Colonel Tucker, the Scholar, 45 LA. L. REV. 1007, 1007 
(1985). 
 4. A. N. Yiannopoulos, John H. Tucker, the Jurisconsult, 45 LA. L. REV. 
1011 (1985). 




but be impressed by his articulate defence of the civil law in Louisi-
ana, the important role he saw for law reform, as well as his views 
on the centrality of the university and the legal scholar in the devel-
opment of law.5 After reading about his remarkable life and incred-
ible contributions to the law, I could not think of a worthier name-
sake for this prestigious lecture. 
II. QUEBEC AND LOUISIANA: LAW SISTERS 
My lecture began with an explanation of its title: “From La 
Beauce to Le Bayou: A Transsystemic Voyage.” A Louisianan au-
dience was not likely to be fazed by the reference to le Bayou but 
would, understandably, be more perplexed about the reference to la 
Beauce.6 La Beauce is a picturesque region of the province of Que-
bec that stretches along the Chaudière River, located about thirty 
minutes south of Quebec City. It is an enchanting part of Quebec 
and a popular tourist destination, both in winter and summer, for the 
variety of outdoor activities it offers. Le Bayou, of course, refers to 
a very different geographical region, and while water characterizes 
both, that is probably where the similarities end. A bayou is, as my 
audience knew better than I, a low-lying wetland found primarily in 
the southern part of Louisiana, home to alligators, crawfish, catfish 
and Cajun culture. Also, an attractive tourist destination, the bayou 
is a defining feature of this part of the United States. 
Why did I suggest travelling from la Beauce to le Bayou? And 
what is a transsystemic voyage? Transsystemia does not reside any-
where, let alone in la Beauce, because it is not a place or a thing, not 
a noun but, rather, an adjective describing a unique way of teaching 
and thinking about law. I confess to using these two destinations 
merely as poetic (and alliterative) license to bring something that is 
happening in a law school, namely McGill, in Montreal, Quebec 
 
 5. See John H. Tucker, jr. The Role of the Law School in Law Reform, 17 
LA. L. REV. 581 (1957). See also T. Haller Jr. Jackson, John Tucker and the Law 
Institute, 45 LA. L. REV. 999 (1985). 
 6. The reference is to la Beauce, Quebec, not la Beauce, France. 




(home to la Beauce) to Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana (home to le Bayou). I thought that my Louisianan audi-
ence was particularly well-suited to accompany me on this voyage 
because while la Beauce and le Bayou are different places with dif-
ferent geographical features, Quebec and Louisiana share many sim-
ilarities. 
Quebec and Louisiana have been called “law sisters”7 and Pro-
fessor Vernon Palmer has convincingly argued that we belong to the 
same legal family.8 As Palmer asserts, our histories are indeed “con-
nected and parallel.”9 After all, we both started out with the same 
Coutume de Paris as our law, extended by Louis XIV to Quebec in 
1663 and to Louisiana in 1712.10 France ceded Louisiana to Spain 
in the 1760s, at around the same time it ceded Quebec to Britain.11 
And much of Louisiana’s population are descendants of Acadian ex-
iles from the Maritimes in Canada12 (“Acadien” being the root of the 
term “Cajun”).13 
Furthermore, we are both “mixed” jurisdictions in similar ways. 
Our private law is civilian in both substance and methodology and is codi-
fiedthe Code and the civil law, as Olivier Moréteau has pointed out, are our 
“markers of identity.”14 Both of our civil codes have historically been based 
on the Code Napoléon and our civil law influenced by French thinkers such 
 
 7. Alain A. Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana 
Civil Law Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Com-
parativists Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715, 741 (2009). 
 8. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Quebec and Her Sisters in the Third Legal 
Family, 54 MCGILL L.J. 321 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 323. 
 10. Jerah Johnson, La Coutume de Paris: Louisiana’s First Law, 30 LOUISI-
ANA HISTORY: THE JOURNAL OF THE LOUISIANA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 145, 
150-51 (1989). 
 11. Alain A. Levasseur, Bijuralism in Federal Systems and in Regions of Lo-
cal Autonomy, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 23, 31 (1990). France ceded Quebec to 
Britain in the Treaty of Paris, 1763. 
 12. Levasseur, supra note 7, at 718. 
 13. See, e.g., Luc V. Baronian, Pre-Acadian Cajun French, 31 ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE BERKELEY LINGUISTICS SOCIETY 37, 39 (2014). 
 14. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in Lou-
isiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 33 (2012). 




as Pothier and Domat.15 Yet, in both our cases, our civil law plays out in 
courts that function like common law courts, with judges who share many 
attributes of the common law judicial function including in how they are ap-
pointed (or in the case of state judges in Louisiana, elected) to the bench (there 
is no École de la magistrature in either Quebec or Louisiana) as well as in the 
fact that they write personalized and discursive judgments that can in-
clude dissents.16  
Perhaps most importantly, we are both civilian based jurisdic-
tions surrounded on all sides by the common law. Quebec is the only 
civilian presence among Canada’s ten provinces and three territories 
and, of course, Louisiana the only civilian state in the United States. 
We, and our codes, are, to quote Moréteau, “a powerful symbol of 
the survival of the civil law tradition on a continent dominated by 
the common law.”17  
There are, of course, many distinctive features that separate us. 
Language is one. As Alain Levasseur points out, both Quebec and 
Louisiana make use of an English civilian legal vocabulary.18 In this 
regard, we can recall Nicholas Kasirer’s 2014 Tucker Lecture about 
the “Montreal sound” of the civil law and the dialogic relationship 
between the civil law in French and in English in Quebec.19 But 
what distinguishes the two places is the fact that French has largely 
been lost as a legal language in Louisiana, while French thrives in 
Quebec.20 With about 80% of Quebeckers listing French as their 
mother tongue and 87% listing it as the language they speak at home, 
law, like life, in Quebec, happens in French.21 The Quebec legal 
community is a very bilingual one, but the reality is that law is 
 
 15. Palmer, supra note 8, at 323. 
 16. Moréteau, supra note 14, at 46. See also Rosalie Jukier, Inside the Judi-
cial Mind: Exploring Judicial Methodology in the Mixed Legal System of Quebec, 
6 J. COMP. L. 54 (2011). 
 17. Moréteau, supra note 14, at 33. 
 18. Levasseur, supra note 7, at 726. 
 19. Kasirer, supra note 2. 
 20. Levasseur, supra note 11, at 36-38 (explaining the erosion of French in 
Louisiana). 
 21. Statistics Canada, French and the Francophonie in Canada—Language, 
2011 Census of Population, 2 (2011) https://perma.cc/4K55-7CVY.  




practiced largely in French and most judicial decisions are drafted 
in French as well. A further linguistic difference lies in the fact that 
there exists no official French version of the Louisiana Civil Code 
(although there is a marvellous unofficial translation edited by 
Moréteau22), while the Quebec Civil Code, and all other Quebec 
laws, exists in French and in English with both versions being offi-
cial.23 
As for civilian legal culture, Quebec saw what John Brierley has 
called an important “renewal of [its] distinct legal culture” in the 
1991 recodification of the Civil Code of Quebec (which came into 
force in 1994).24 Moreover, as Moréteau has pointed out, the cen-
trality of the Civil Code of Quebec is reinforced by its Preliminary 
Provision asserting it as the jus commune and the foundation of all 
other laws.25 The thriving civilian legal culture in Quebec is rein-
forced by the predominance of civilian legal education in the prov-
ince. Unlike Louisiana, the civil law degree is the primary degree 
offered by Quebec law schools, not the common law JD.26 It is also 
marked by a mandatory civilian presence on the country’s highest 
 
 22.  See CODE CIVIL DE LOUSIANE ÉDITION BILINGUE (Olivier Moréteau ed., 
Société de législation comparée 2017). 
 23.  See, e.g., Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862 (Can.). 
 24. John E. C. Brierley, The Renewal of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: 
The New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 484 (1992). 
 25. Moréteau, supra note 14, at 59-60; Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 
64, Preliminary Provision (Can.):  
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights 
and freedoms and the general principles of law, governs persons, rela-
tions between persons, and property. The Civil Code comprises a body 
of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its pro-
visions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these 
matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws 
may complement the Code or make exceptions to it. 
See  also Olivier Moréteau, An  Introduction to Contamination, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 
9, 14 (2010), where he asserts that Quebec’s Preliminary Provision helps prevent 
common law contamination as it reminds us that, “the Civil Code is a central star 
in the private law galaxy.”  
 26. With the exception of McGill, where, pursuant to its integrated program, 
all students graduate with both B.C.L. (civil law) and LL.B. (common law) de-
grees, in all other Quebec law schools, the primary degree is the civil law degree. 
Some Quebec law schools do offer a separate program in the common law but it 
is not required, nor is it integrated with the rest of their legal education. 




court because, again very unlike the United States, three out of the 
nine Canadian Supreme Court justices must be Quebec jurists.27 Fi-
nally, the political perspective in Quebec, where legal nationalism 
complements political nationalism, is very different from that of 
Louisiana.28  
And yet, as Vernon Palmer has written, “[o]ne might say our 
experience and our fortunes as mixed systems are different yet kin-
dred, and our relationship as sister systems has been comme un voy-
age ensemble dans tous ces aspects amicaux culturels et jurid-
iques.”29 Hence, the rest of my title: a transsystemic voyage. I had 
toyed with continuing the alliteration and entitling my talk a Trans-
systemic Trip or Transsystemic Travels, but I settled on voyage be-
cause of its bilingual nature and therefore its applicability both to 
Quebec and to Louisiana, and to this passage by Vernon Palmer 
from which I drew inspiration.  
III. THE TRANSSYSTEMIC VOYAGE 
In my Tucker Lecture, I wanted to take my audience on a voyage 
using a transsystemic itinerary, namely a voyage that would show-
case a unique way of teaching and thinking about law. This journey 
had three legs. The first was meant to demystify the elusive term 
“transsystemic” and to explain what is meant by a uniquely compar-
ative, bilingual, multi-systemic, pluralistic, cosmopolitan and dia-
logic way of teaching and thinking about law. How did this program 
come to be at McGill and how do we actually do it? The second leg 
of the journey presented the pedagogical and intellectual benefits of 
the transsystemic approach—what we and our students have gained 
 
 27. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, §§ 3, 6 (Can.). See also Refer-
ence re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 (Can.). 
 28. There have been two referenda, 1980 and 1995, on whether Quebec 
should secede from Canada and although explicit recognition of the idea has been 
the source of much political controversy, Quebec is often referred to as a “distinct 
society” within Canada. See, e.g., Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Ca-
nadian Federalism, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 67, 68-70 (1996). 
 29. Palmer, supra note 8, at 324. 




by integrating the study of law by transcending jurisdictional and 
tradition-specific boundaries, eschewing silos, and introducing hy-
bridity into our classrooms and our research. And the final leg at-
tempted to demonstrate what I believe to be the increasing relevance 
of the transsystemic approach as a way of preparing jurists, wher-
ever they are, for the complexity and novelty of contemporary legal 
practice. 
A. The First Leg of the Journey: Packing Bags 
In order to embark on the first leg of the trip, we needed to pack 
our bags. In this case, our baggage represents McGill’s institutional 
history and while I will not go as far back as the beginning of our 
law program at McGill, officially created in 1848, I will recall what 
we did between 1968–1999 where, for that period of three decades, 
we offered what we called a “National Programme” in which we 
taught both civil and common law but did so in a very siloed way. 
There were, at that time, two points of entry for students into the 
Faculty and they pursued either the Civil Law or the Common Law 
stream with the possibility of obtaining two law degrees (B.C.L., 
LL.B.) or only one. Our National Programme was essentially a tra-
ditional three-year monosystemic law program with the possibility 
of adding on one year in the other tradition.30 
In 1999, we underwent what some described as a veritable program-
matic and pedagogical revolution, what Harry Arthurs, renowned law 
professor at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto and former President 
of York University, called, “one of the most unusual curriculum experi-
ments.”31 What seemed so revolutionary was that we moved to one point 
 
 30. This was not the first time McGill’s Law Faculty had offered two law 
degrees in both of Canada’s legal traditions. In 1916, McGill began offering a 
three-year common law degree in addition to its three-year civil law degree pro-
gram as well as the possibility of obtaining both degrees in four years, but this 
was abandoned in 1924. See Roderick A. Macdonald, The National Law Pro-
gramme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, Prospects, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 211, 
250, 260 (1990). 
 31. Harry Arthurs, Madly off in One Direction: McGill’s New Integrated, 
Polyjural, Transsystemic Law Programme, 50 MCGILL L.J. 707, 709 (2005). 




of entry for all law students (and a single admissions pool) whereby we 
would teach private law in an integrated manner and all graduates would 
obtain both civil law and common law degrees.32 Courses would con-
tinue to be offered in English or French, and taken in either language at 
the option of the student. However, the materials would include sources 
from both legal traditions and thus would be bilingual, as our policy is to 
include sources in their original language. Consequently, all students 
would have to be what we call “passively bilingual,” namely, able to read 
and understand oral French and English but permitted to speak and write, 
for purposes of evaluation, whichever language they preferred.  
Many ask why we embarked on this new program. Looking back 
two decades, it now seems, in retrospect, that our goals were quite 
modest but at the time, our aspirations were seen by some to be 
overly ambitious and even unattainable. To be truthful, we had many 
laudatory aspirations that I will outline shortly, but we also had some 
instrumental ones. For one, our distinct applicant pools to the civil 
and common law streams risked being uneven in terms of numbers 
and strength of applicants and we wanted to even them out. We also 
thought that creating a unique program of legal education would at-
tract the strongest, most interesting and diverse applicants to our law 
faculty. 
More importantly, we had serious pedagogical aspirations. An 
explicit goal was the improvement of our comparative teaching be-
cause although McGill had the reputation of being a comparative 
law school where we had some renowned comparativists, such as H. 
Patrick Glenn, on faculty, in reality, our program did not meaning-
fully allow for explicit comparative learning by students. From the 
students’ perspective, they took private law classes in monosystemic 
silos with no overt comparative law going on in them. Expecting 
students to make the comparisons themselves between different 
classes, in the different legal traditions, taken in different years, was 
 
 32. To obtain both law degrees, students must successfully complete 105 
credits in 3-4 years of study. 




slightly unrealistic. Moreover, right from the beginning, we had this 
idea that it could only be beneficial to learn from the other—what 
Yves Marie Morissette, former Dean of the Faculty and now a jus-
tice on Quebec’s Court of Appeal, called a “humble dialog with oth-
erness.”33  
Finally, we had an identity-related aspiration. We wanted 
to educate students without a particular juridical nationality 
who would become, in the words of one of my former students, 
“agnostic jurists.” As someone who, for years, taught civil law 
obligations to second-year common law students and common 
law contracts to second-year civil law students, I can attest to 
the fact that students become very attached to the system in 
which they started their legal studies and I used to do a lot of 
(almost religious) converting!34 
The major pedagogical changes included moving from se-
quential courses to integrated ones—blending the civil and 
common law in, for example, the areas of contracts and extra-
contractual obligations and, as we have just done, in Property, 
where the transsystemic approach blends indigenous legal tra-
ditions as well as those of the civil and common law. This ne-
cessitated changing our course outlines because they could no 
longer be organized around traditional doctrinal categories as 
the syntax and nomenclature do not match up. Although chal-
lenging, this actually had the fortunate consequence of moving 
to teaching by theme or pre-law question. And, once you 
started to teach in multiple legal traditions in the same course, 
it was only natural to start to teach legal rules and principles in 
 
 33. Yves-Marie Morissette, McGill’s Integrated Civil and Common Law 
Program, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 12, 22 (2002). 
 34. See Julie Bedard, Transsystemic Teaching of Law at McGill: Radical 
Changes, Old and New Hats, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 237, 273 (2001) (who agrees that 
students identified with the first legal system they learned). 




a way that linked them to their tradition-based methodology 
and mentality as well as unique historical development.35 
Introducing hybridity of legal orders into the classroom was ac-
complished, in large part, by expanding curricular content to include 
a multiplicity of sources of law from a variety of jurisdictions and 
legal traditions. These sources are of varying kinds including tradi-
tional sources such as state law, judicial decisions and doctrinal 
writings, as well as less traditional sources such as soft-law instru-
ments including UNIDROIT or the U.S. Restatement, and even non-
traditional sources including stories and ceremonies. While lan-
guage often inhibits law professors from including foreign materials 
in their courses, given that we use sources written in both French 
and English, regardless of the language of instruction of the partic-
ular course, we are able to access a wide variety of sources.  
Although, admittedly, materials are still primarily from 
Quebec and common law Canada, the goals of curricular re-
form are enriched by studying a multitude of jurisdictions, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, the United States (including, of 
course, Louisiana), Germany, France and Australia to name 
just a few. The idea, however, is not one of coverage. The in-
tention is not to compare the various laws of as many jurisdic-
tions as one can fit into a single class. Rather, the idea is to 
unleash law from any particular political geography or state 
normativity, to “de-couple[] the idea of law from the idea of 
the state,” and to teach without reference to one particular state 
as the central focus.36 This, of course, as Harry Arthurs noted, 
“challenges the notion that law’s logic is bounded, its values 
fixed, its processes ascertainable, and its outcomes 
 
 35. Rosalie Jukier, Where Law and Pedagogy Meet in the Transsystemic 
Contracts Classroom, 50 MCGILL L.J. 789 (2005) (specific performance is used 
as a case in point to demonstrate how transsystemic pedagogy teaches students to 
connect legal concepts to their socio-historical roots). 
 36. Harry W. Arthurs, Law and Learning in an Era of Globalization, 10 GER-
MAN L.J. 629, 635 (2009). 




predictable.”37 Consequently, sources are used merely as 
lenses, or hypotheses of solutions and approaches, thereby 
teaching students the crucial lesson that there is not one answer 
or one structure of reality to any given legal issue or human 
problem. We need to teach law students to tolerate ambiguity. 
New words were used and even invented to describe our unique 
pedagogy. Some were prosaic—boring but accurate terms such as 
“integrated” or “blended.” Others were confusing such as “trans-
systemic.”38 Other descriptors were sexy like “cosmopolitan”39 and 
“pluralist”40 and still others were poetic and exotic such as the words 
used by Nicholas Kasirer—“nomadic,” “dialogic,” and engaged in 
“métissage.”41 Soon, our legal curriculum was being described as 
uniquely comparative, “bilingual, multi-systemic, and pluralistic,”42 
characterized by “an epistemological and pedagogical practice at 
once pluralist, polycentric, non-positivist, and interactive.”43 No 
wonder my wonderful late colleague and former Dean of our Fac-
ulty, Roderick A. Macdonald, said, “[i]f it’s not impossible, it’s not 
worth doing!”44 But despite these fancy descriptors, what we call 
the transsystemic approach simply integrates the study of law by 
 
 37. Id. at 637. 
 38. See, e.g., Daniel Jutras, Pour en finir avec la Transystémie (sic), in RE-
PENSER LES PARADIGMES : APPROCHES TRANSSYSTÉMIQUES DU DROIT 73 (Yaëll 
Emerich & Marie-Andrée Plante eds., 2018).  
 39. Richard Janda, Toward Cosmopolitan Law, 50 MCGILL L.J. 967, 967 
(2005). 
 40. Roderick A. Macdonald & Jason MacLean, No Toilets in Park, 50 
MCGILL L.J. 721, 721 (2005). 
 41. Nicholas Kasirer, Legal Education as Métissage, 78 TUL. L. REV. 481, 
490 (2003). 
 42. These are all descriptors that have been used in reference to the McGill 
program. See, e.g., McGill University Senate, Appendix B: Academic Program 
Reviews 2004-2008: Final Program Review Summary Sheets − Faculty of Law: 
B.C.L./LL.B. Program, in Report of the Academic Policy Committee D08-56 1, 1 
(2009): https://perma.cc/TBW3-JCN8.  
 43. Macdonald, supra note 40, at 721. The French version of this description 
was used by the Université d’Auvergne in its conference program, La trans-
systémie : pour une approche rénovée de la conception et de l’enseignement du 
droit, available at: https://perma.cc/5Y9M-HCW2. 
 44. Roderick A. Macdonald, If It’s Not Impossible, It’s Not Worth Doing: 
The Challenges of Trans-systemic Legal Education, Paper Delivered at Harvard 
University Law School (Nov. 22, 2004) (unpublished). 




transcending jurisdictional and tradition-specific boundaries, es-
chewing silos, and introducing hybridity into our classrooms 
and our research. 
B. The Second Leg of the Journey: Sightseeing 
Once the bags were packed and my audience had arrived at our 
destination, the second leg of the journey could begin. This leg of 
any trip usually involves some sightseeing and for our purposes, this 
entailed exploring what freeing courses from jurisdictional bounda-
ries has enabled us to do. 
In my opinion, we have been able to surpass our original aspira-
tions articulated just two decades ago. We have certainly accom-
plished the goal of eschewing silos and transcending jurisdictional 
and tradition-specific boundaries. We have also made comparative 
law a more explicit part of pedagogy and have taught students to 
approach comparative law in a holistic sense, as a way to imagine 
responses to underlying questions and larger thematic problems, ra-
ther than as a form of side-by-side doctrinal comparison. Undoubt-
edly, our approach has encouraged learning from the other which, 
in turn, has taught us the valuable lesson that learning from the other 
has truly enabled us to learn more about ourselves. After all, under-
standing the differences in another mode of thinking (such as an-
other legal tradition) causes one to question the approach in one’s 
own mode of thinking (or legal tradition), which ultimately invites 
opportunity for greater insight and more sophisticated contempla-
tion of both. 
The retreat from a focus on the law of a given jurisdiction has 
also forcibly moved our teaching away from its traditional exposi-
tory function towards a more critical one. Moreover, transsystemic 
thinking has found a more natural home in an academic and intel-
lectual view of the law (which has always been McGill’s vocation), 




rather than a professional one.45 The pedagogical implications of 
teaching transsystemically freed professors from trying to teach “the 
law” (which is, of course, impossible) and encouraged them to teach 
students the tools they need to discover law for themselves.46  
The reorganization of courses around broad themes and larger 
questions, rather than tradition-specific doctrinal titles, has moved 
teaching towards a more interactive model. Once the focus is no 
longer on teaching legal doctrines but on solving human problems 
through different lenses, there is a tendency to use more problem-
based learning. This, in turn, creates a more active learning environ-
ment for students and more interaction in the classroom, all condu-
cive to introducing some form of a “flipped classroom” for those 
who are keen to engage in this type of pedagogy.47 
Transsystemic teaching and thinking invited a true paradigm 
shift on many levels, including the very questioning of law as the 
privileged response to human problems. Acknowledging that law is 
but one lens through which we can analyze and solve human prob-
lems has had the effect of encouraging the integration of more inter-
disciplinary perspectives, such as economic, historical, 
 
 45. See Nicholas Kasirer, Bijuralism in Law’s Empire and in Law’s Cosmos, 
52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29 (2002). Kasirer described this well using the metaphors of 
Law’s cosmos versus Law’s empire. To teach a given legal tradition in Law’s 
empire aims to teach law as it is both spatially and temporally articulated and felt. 
To learn in Law’s cosmos, however, infers concerns with the social and theoreti-
cal dimensions of law so as to more meaningfully grasp the nature of law itself. 
 46. A commonly held resistance to transsystemic pedagogy has been the 
‘coverage’ issue, namely that professors already have too much material to teach 
without adding an entire other legal tradition to their course. McGill professors 
must accept that it is not realistic to teach every black letter detail of the law. 
Instead, the approach is to train students for life-long learning, to think inde-
pendently and to uncover law themselves. 
 47. In a “flipped classroom,” students are expected to come to class “know-
ing” the material, sometimes by listening to pre-recorded video or audio lectures 
online, and then class time is an opportunity to apply and discuss material in dy-
namic in-class activities. See, e.g., LUTZ-CHRISTIAN WOLFF & JENNY CHAN, 
FLIPPED CLASSROOMS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (Springer 2016). While most clas-
ses at McGill are not taught using the flipped classroom model, many professors 
have moved away from expository teaching and use problem-based learning as 
the focus of their pedagogy. 




philosophical, sociological, and feminist approaches, into law clas-
ses.48 It has also encouraged us to multiply the perspectives on how 
to solve problems and to teach students that the adjudication of dis-
putes through the civil justice system is not the only, or indeed ideal, 
way to proceed. Students are encouraged to locate law and legal ed-
ucation all around them, not only in appellate decisions, thereby re-
inforcing the pluralistic conception of legal education.49 
One of the most important pedagogical benefits of teaching 
transsystemically is that it operates as a vehicle for instilling crea-
tive, critical and flexible thinking skills in students, skills I believe 
they will really need as they lead their lives as jurists of the twenty-
first century.50 Critical thinking is characterized by analyzing, eval-
uating and creating knowledge, as well as by questioning underlying 
assumptions, discovering that which is hidden, and challenging or-
thodoxy.51 This is precisely what the transsystemic classroom ac-
tively encourages. Learning other perspectives reduces the chance 
that students will accept legal responses as orthodox wisdom and 
increases the chance that they will be open to embracing, and creat-
ing, other solutions. A student who studies the civil and common 
law traditions simultaneously will be better equipped to question the 
very existence of certain doctrines, which may be treated as gospel 
in one legal tradition but find no voice in another. For example, the 
common law notions of consideration (seemingly the core of 
 
 48. RODERICK A. MACDONALD ET AL., LESSONS OF EVERYDAY LAW 7 
(McGill-Queen’s U. Press 2002). 
 49. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Legal Education on the Threshold of the 
1980’s: Whatever Happened to the Great Ideas of the 60’s, 44 SASK. L. REV. 39, 
48 (1979); Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the 
AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 6 (1999). 
 50. See Rosalie Jukier, The Impact of ‘Stateless Law’ on Legal Pedagogy, in 
STATELESS LAW: EVOLVING BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE 201, 205-211 (Helge 
Dedek & Shauna Van Praagh eds., 2018). 
 51. See, e.g., Lisa Tsui, Cultivating Critical Thinking: Insights from an Elite 
Liberal Arts College, 56 THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL EDUCATION 200, 201 (2007); 
Nickolas James et al., Conceptualising, Developing and Assessing Critical Think-
ing in Law, 15 TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 285, 287 (2010); Janet Wein-
stein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Education 
in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319, 321 (1999). 




contract law) and duty of care (an ever-domineering gatekeeper to 
tort liability) have no place in the civilian tradition. Students who 
have studied both traditions, and easily envisage a legal order with 
or without their effect, may be more amenable to critically decon-
structing the underlying reasons and justifications of such legal re-
sponses. Transsystemic pedagogy is thus instrumental in creating 
independent and innovative, rather than mechanistic, thinkers as the 
emphasis is placed on the process, not the result; on the question, 
not the answer; on the how and why, not the what. 
The bilingual nature of the program has also yielded compelling 
benefits.52 Reading legal documents in their original language en-
sures respecting the cultural and political role that law plays in so-
ciety and is also, arguably, an important pedagogical aspect of trans-
systemic legal education. As my colleague, Shauna Van Praagh, has 
argued, there is a deep connection between McGill’s bilingual learn-
ing environment and the creativity and empathy so characteristic of 
the transsystemic method because, as she says, 
[E]very single student in the faculty . . . can understand at 
some level what it means to belong to the minority in a group 
. . . . The student, who in many law faculties across this coun-
try, would be characterized as being in the majority . . . who 
is Anglophone, is going to know what it feels like to be in a 
minority walking in the streets of Montréal . . . to know what 
vulnerability feels like . . . [creating] an ability to empathize 
and listen, and to imagine . . . . There is a shakiness about 
just existing in Quebec that actually makes teaching and 
learning law really exciting, because of that ability to empa-
thize and cross identities.53  
 
 52. See, e.g., Daniel Jutras, Enoncer l’indicible : le droit entre langues et tra-
ditions, 4 REV. INT. DR. COMP. 781, 792 (2000) (arguing that in allowing for “un 
veritable dialogue bijuridique”, bilingualism facilitates authentic bijuralism. 
However, bilingualism has also been cited as one of the challenges for many law 
faculties in adopting a similar teaching methodology, a “road block” to exporta-
bility). See Helena Whalen-Bridge, A Common Law Fly on the Transsystemic 
Wall: Observing the Integrated Method at McGill Faculty of Law, 51 THE LAW 
TEACHER 188, 201 (2017). 
 53. Andrea Bjorklund et al., Teaching the Law: A Roundtable Discussion, 5 
CONTOURS 77, 81, 84 (2016). 




The benefits of transsystemic pedagogy have by no means been 
restricted to students and, given the symbiosis between pedagogy 
and scholarship, professors have also been profoundly impacted by 
the program. That transsystemic pedagogy encourages trans-
systemic thinking amongst professors is evidenced in the research 
produced by legal scholars immersed in this mode of teaching and 
thinking. Initially, many members of McGill’s Law Faculty, includ-
ing myself, produced scholarship on transsystemic pedagogy.54 To-
day, we are beginning to see an output of what may be called, more 
broadly, transsystemic scholarship. A notable example is Yaëll 
Emerich’s recently published book, Droit commun des biens : per-
spective transsystémique, whose dialogue between various legal tra-
ditions unearths an intricate inspection of common perspectives on 
property law amongst civilian, common law and aboriginal law tra-
ditions.55 For my own part, transsystemic teaching has helped me 
reconceive my research questions, a large part of which have come 
to focus on the impact of legal traditions on such topics as judicial 
methodology or civil procedure and, most recently, to explore the 
impact of legal traditions on each other.56 
 
 54. See, e.g., McGill Law Journal’s special issue: Navigating the Trans-
systemic, 50 MCGILL L. J. 701 (2005) (including articles by McGill professors 
Roderick A. Macdonald, H. Patrick Glenn, Richard Janda, and Rosalie Jukier). 
See also Helge Dedek & Armand de Mestral, Born to be Wild: The Trans-Sys-
temic Programme at McGill and the De-Nationalization of Legal Education, 
10 GERMAN L.J. 889(2009); Kasirer, supra note 45; Morissette, supra note 33; 
and Daniel Jutras, Two Arguments for Cross-Cultural Legal Education, in UN-
TERSCHIEDLICHE RECHTSKULTUREN: KONVERGENZ DES RECHTSDENKENS / DIF-
FERENT LEGAL CULTURES: CONVERGENCE OF LEGAL REASONING 75 (Heinz-Di-
eter Assman, Gert Bruggemeier & Rolf Sethe eds. 2001). 
 55. YAËLL EMERICH, DROIT COMMUN DES BIENS : PERSPECTIVE TRANSSYSTÉ-
MIQUE (Yvon Blais 2017). See also Shauna Van Praagh, Palsgraf as ‘Trans-
systemic’ Tort Law, 6 J. COMP. L. 243 (2011); Helge Dedek, From Norms to 
Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and Civil Private Law, 56 MCGILL 
L.J. 77 (2010); Daniel Jutras, Civil Law and Pure Economic Loss: What Are We 
Missing?, 12 CAN. BUS. L.J. 295 (1987). 
 56. See, e.g., Jukier, supra note 16; Rosalie Jukier, The Impact of Legal Tra-
ditions on Quebec Procedural Law: Lessons from Quebec’s New Code of Civil 
Procedure, 93 CAN. B. REV. 211 (2015); Rosalie Jukier, Good Faith in Contract: 
A Judicial Dialogue Between Common Law Canada and Québec, 1 THE J. OF 
COMMONWEALTH L. 1 (2019). 




This leg of the voyage cannot end without some caveats. These 
include the admission that we at McGill have no monopoly on im-
parting critical thinking skills, integrating pluralism and inter-disci-
plinarity into the classroom or even making the learning of law more 
interactive. These all can, and do, happen in monosystemic law fac-
ulties. Moreover, McGill has no monopoly on how to be trans-
systemic. While the University of Luxembourg has emulated our 
program and adopted a version that might be called a close cousin, 
the University of Victoria in Western Canada has recently inaugu-
rated a different sort of integrated program of legal education, 
namely a Joint Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous 
Legal Orders.57 This is an extremely interesting example of a differ-
ent way to integrate several legal orders into a unified program of 
law study. As the transsystemic approach itself has taught us, there 
is never just one way of doing anything, including transsystemic le-
gal education.  
Nonetheless, I think it can be persuasively argued that McGill’s 
transsystemic classroom has led to many impressive results, and that 
the positive consequences of moving to this way of teaching and 
thinking flow somewhat naturally from a program of this kind. This 
is because once the emphasis on a single jurisdiction’s state law and 
its doctrinal categorization is abandoned, students and professors are 
forced to think about legal problems holistically and in new ways 
that stretch beyond traditional boundaries. After all, the great gift of 
creativity is the ability to make connections and we can only teach 
our students, and ourselves, to do that if we break down silos.  
 
 57. See, e.g., University of Luxembourg’s new “transnational” Bachelor’s in 
Law (Bachelor en droit) (academic), online: https://perma.cc/74U5-2576; see Ja-
mie Cassels, University of Victoria, Contributing to Canada’s Social and Eco-
nomic Prosperity: A Proposal for an Innovative Common Law/Indigenous Law 
Program 1 (2016): https://perma.cc/EL2J-ZL83. The University of Victoria pro-
gram accepted its first intake of students in September 2018. 




C. The Third Leg of the Journey: Reflections 
The final leg of any journey involves introspection. We all return 
home from our travels somewhat changed by what we saw and 
learned, and this influences us for the future. As a result, this final 
leg of our transsystemic journey entails us looking to the future and 
considering why this way of thinking about law is becoming more 
and more important for jurists who will make their mark on this 
twenty-first century. 
It is an important question to ask because after all, this way of 
teaching law can be destabilizing and difficult for students, some 
would say confusing and even frustrating. And if graduates will, for 
the most part, practice in one jurisdiction, why do they need to learn 
about so many others? It certainly will not help them with their bar 
exams.58 It can also be hard for professors because in addition to 
being required to handle legal materials bilingually, professors are 
expected to have expertise in multiple legal environments. Moreo-
ver, as there are no transsystemic teaching materials on the market, 
they must create their own from scratch. Perhaps more importantly, 
professors must continually guard against the risk of superficiality 
when they reference isolated legislative provisions or court deci-
sions from a foreign legal system into their curriculum. After all, I 
may reference an Australian High Court decision in my contracts 
class, but I certainly do not pretend to be an expert in Australian law 
as a whole. William Bishop has appropriately warned against mak-
ing “casual comparisons” stating that, “[i]t is not prudent to consider 
one difference in isolation from the others, for that difference may 
so easily be balanced by some other factor not considered.”59 
 
 58. See generally Aline Grenon, H. Patrick Glenn & Helge Dedek, The 
Global Challenge in Common and Civil Law Contexts: A Canadian Perspective, 
in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION 75, 83 (Christophe Jamin 
& William Van Caenegem eds. 2016). 
 59. William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 299, 318 (1985). After all, a professor may use an Australian decision 
to inspire a discussion of interesting legal questions and concerns in the class, but 
neither professor nor students understand Australian law in its totality. 




We cannot, however, be dissuaded by these potential difficul-
ties. The challenges are outweighed not only by the many pedagog-
ical and intellectual benefits outlined above, but also by three addi-
tional reasons that justify the importance of this approach to legal 
thinking. These reasons are linked to our obligation to prepare jurists 
for the complexity and novelty of contemporary legal practice, re-
gardless of its form or place. My three reasons include how jurists 
can face: I Novel Problems; II Novel Problem-Solving Methods; 
and III Novel Judicial Methodology. 
1. Novel Problems 
Article 9 of Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure (C.C.P.) might 
be seen as proclaiming an obvious proposition, namely that, “[i]t is 
the mission of the courts to adjudicate the disputes brought before 
them, in accordance with the applicable rules of law.” At times, 
however, the dispute that comes before the court requires the judici-
ary to solve what may be termed a “novel problem,” one in which 
there is no obvious answer or appropriate resolution using the ordi-
nary legal tools at its disposal in its present arsenal. Traditionally, 
this is the way law often develops, particularly in common law sys-
tems, but true in civilian ones as well.60  
Analyzing a novel problem through a transsystemic lens can be 
particularly useful in these situations. For the purposes of illustra-
tion, a contemporary example of what may be classified as a novel 
problem emanating from Quebec may be found in the case of 
Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. Ltd. v. Hydro-Québec, decided by 
the Quebec Court of Appeal in July 2016 and by the Supreme Court 
 
 60. Various important aspects of Quebec civil law were developed in this 
way. See, e.g., the jurisprudential development of unjust enrichment in Cie Im-
mobiliere Viger v. L. Giguere Inc. (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 67 (Can.) and the cre-
ation of a doctrine of good faith in contract performance in National Bank v. Sou-
cisse et al., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 339 (Can.), 1981 CanLII 31; and Houle v. Canadian 
National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122 (Can.), 1990 CanLII 58. 




of Canada in November 2018.61 In brief, this case centered on a con-
tractual dispute relating to a long-term contract signed in 1969 with 
a sixty-five year term. Pursuant to the contract, Hydro-Québec un-
dertook to purchase almost all the energy generated by the Churchill 
Falls power plant in Newfoundland and Labrador at a fixed price. 
However, during the life of this contract, significant changes oc-
curred in the global energy market resulting in an exponential rise 
in the value of electricity. Given the fixed contract price, Hydro-
Québec was able to buy electricity at a very low price and realize 
large profits by reselling it at a substantially higher market price. In 
2010, Churchill Falls instituted an action before the Superior Court 
of Quebec arguing that in the circumstances, Hydro-Québec should 
have a duty to renegotiate the contract on the basis of the obligation 
of good faith that is implied into the performance of every contract 
in Quebec law pursuant to articles 1375 and 1434 of the Civil Code 
of Quebec (C.C.Q.).62 Churchill Falls contended that the radical 
changes in the energy market, and the consequential rise in the price 
of electricity, was unforeseeable at contract formation and was cre-
ating an unanticipated windfall profit for Hydro-Québec, one that 
countered the parties’ profit-sharing intention at the time they en-
tered into the contract.  
At first blush, this looks like a straightforward situation of post-con-
tract change of circumstances which, pursuant to Quebec law, only alters 
the contractual obligations of the parties in cases of force majeure, what 
the Louisiana Civil Code terms, in art. 1873, a fortuitous event.63 In order 
to be classified as a force majeure, Quebec law requires “an unforeseea-
ble and irresistible event” and, therefore, unforeseeable external events 
 
 61. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Hydro-Québec, 2016 QCCA 1229 
(Can. Que), aff’d 2018 SCC 46 (Can.) [hereinafter Churchill Falls]. 
 62. Art. 1375 Civil Code of Quebec [hereinafter C.C.Q.]: “The parties shall 
conduct themselves in good faith both at the time the obligation arises and at the 
time it is performed or extinguished.” Art. 1434 C.C.Q: “A contract validly 
formed binds the parties who have entered into it not only as to what they have 
expressed in it but also as to what is incident to it according to its nature and in 
conformity with usage, equity or law.” 
 63. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1873 (2005). 




do not modify the obligatory force of contracts unless they render the 
performance of the contract impossible, not merely more difficult, more 
expensive or less lucrative.64 In other words, the doctrine of imprévision 
(or hardship) is not applicable in Quebec law.65  
As a result, there was no obvious solution to the Churchill Falls 
conundrum in Quebec law except to say that, as the situation did not 
meet the requirements of a force majeure, Churchill Falls had no 
case.66 The legal representatives for Churchill Falls, therefore, had 
no choice but to think out of the box, to tackle the problem in a new 
way and reach out to other legal traditions and sources to craft their 
arguments. In other words, a transsystemic approach was crucial to 
thinking through the legal issues on behalf of Churchill Falls. In-
deed, the arguments laid out in the appellant’s factum (supporting 
Churchill Falls’ position), were heavily based on transsystemic 
thinking.67  
First, the appellant’s arguments drew upon multiple sources and 
perspectives from foreign law to support the use of good faith in 
imposing an obligation of contract renegotiation. Most notably, the 
appellant’s position found support in German law as well as in the 
soft-law instrument of UNIDROIT.68 Secondly, the appellant 
 
 64. Art. 1470, para. 2 C.C.Q. (force majeure, translated as superior force, de-
fined). See also art. 1439 C.C.Q. (binding force of contracts); art. 1693 C.C.Q. 
(restricts excuse for non-performance to situations of force majeure). 
 65. See, e.g., Transport Rosemont Inc. c. Montreal (Ville de), 2008 QCCS 
5507, para. 32 (Can. Que.). See also Canada Starch Co. v. Gill & Dufus (Canada) 
Ltd., [1983] Q.J. No. 567, J.E. 84-88 (Can. Que. S.C.), aff’d 1990 CanLII 2754, 
[1990] J.E. 1617 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 66. This was essentially the conclusion of the Superior Court decision ren-
dered by Silcoff, J. in Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp. v. Hydro-Quebec, 2014 
QCCS 3590 (Can. Que.). 
 67. The appellant was represented by the law firm of IMK and Me Audrey 
Boctor, a graduate of McGill’s transsystemic program, largely penned the factum 
(on file with author). For a summarized view of the appellant’s position, see the 
appellant’s application for leave to appeal (Applicant’s Memorandum of Argu-
ment (Sept. 30, 2016): https://perma.cc/L969-GY7H [hereinafter Applicant’s 
Memorandum]). 
 68. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], art. 242 (Ger.); 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts art 1.7 (UNIDROIT, 2010): https://perma 
.cc/L6C6-C8KA. See also Werner F. Ebke; Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine 




buttressed its legal arguments with theoretical perspectives, notably 
those based on U.S. scholar Ian Macneil’s theory of relational con-
tracts.69 Macneil posits that flexibility in contract law is required to 
deal with long-term contracts that involve symbiotic relationships 
between the parties. Finally, the appellant’s arguments used a holis-
tic approach in that its arguments were not restricted to the silo of 
the doctrinal category of force majeure. Instead, its arguments in-
volved legal creativity and the use of lateral thinking skills in apply-
ing the doctrine of good faith (to renegotiate the contract) to a situ-
ation that appeared to be one of changed circumstances, character-
istic of the transsystemic approach.70  
Although in the end, Churchill Falls failed to convince all but 
one dissenting judge of the Canadian Supreme Court of the merits 
of its argument, this case, and its transsystemic approach, will, I be-
lieve, have an influence on future cases. At the Court of Appeal 
level, it was recognized that the lack of a doctrine of imprévision 
does not alone preclude the use of good faith as a mechanism to 
require the modification of a contract in appropriate circumstances 
of hardship.71 And at the Supreme Court level, much turned on the 
finding by the majority judges that this particular contract could not 
 
of Good Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CON-
TRACT LAW 171 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman eds. 1997). 
 69. Macneil’s conception of relational contracts, contrasted with discrete ex-
change, is summarized in the appellant’s memorandum of argument as “long-
term, interdependent, often called ‘relational’ contracts—that are not just a mo-
ment in time. Parties who engage for the long term form a relationship for their 
sustained mutual benefit and not simply a discreet economic exchange. Because 
parties who engage for such a long time cannot possibly foresee everything, the 
precise terms of the contract are subject to change over time.” (Applicant’s Mem-
orandum, supra note 67, para. 44). See also Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of 
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). 
 70. See generally EDWARD DE BONO, SERIOUS CREATIVITY: USING THE 
POWER OF LATERAL THINKING TO CREATE NEW IDEAS (Harper Business 1992). 
 71. See Churchill Falls, supra note 61, paras. 127, 152. The Court noted that, 
in this situation, the appellant was not suffering hardship. Although Churchill 
Falls did not share in the significant gains resulting from the higher market price 
of electricity, it continued to profit from the power contract. 




be characterized as a relational one, which would benefit from a 
heightened duty of good faith.72 
2. Novel Problem-Solving Methods 
Admittedly, few legal problems will be of the Churchill Falls 
magnitude or novelty but, more generally, we are witnessing a move 
away from adjudication as the primary resolution mechanism in an 
attempt to solve legal problems of all sorts using a wide variety of 
alternative methods of dispute resolution, commonly referred to as 
ADR. There are, of course, various reasons for this, including the 
high cost and inordinate delays of litigation,73 the confidentiality 
that ADR provides the parties,74 and the autonomy and control over 
the outcome that a more collaborative process of dispute resolution 
offers. This potential for collaboration and control often results in a 
greater sense of satisfaction in any settlement outcome because the 
parties themselves have participated in the process rather than hav-
ing justice imposed on them.75 
At least in Canada, today, there is not only an increased recog-
nition of the value of ADR, but indeed an increased obligation on 
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the part of parties to use non-adjudicative modes of resolving con-
flict. For example, Quebec’s new Code of Civil Procedure, which 
came into force in January 2016, states that “[p]arties must consider 
private prevention and resolution processes before referring their 
dispute to the courts.”76 While the parties need not actually solve 
their dispute using ADR, they are obliged to demonstrate their at-
tempt to do so and may be strongly encouraged to engage in ADR 
by a judge acting in their case management capacity. The new code 
includes conciliation as one of the roles of the judiciary and Quebec 
even offers free judicial mediation services.77 Quebec is not alone 
in moving towards a requirement that parties in dispute use ADR 
techniques before pursuing adjudication through the civil justice 
system. For example, Ontario’s Rules of Procedure also require that 
litigating parties undergo mandatory mediation before continuing 
with any lawsuit they have launched.78  
One of the key benefits of ADR, of course, is that it often enables 
parties to arrive at “solutions that no court has jurisdiction to pro-
vide.”79 It is more flexible and encourages the resolution of disputes 
through creative solutions. A transsystemic legal education is well 
suited to forming jurists who can conceive of creative and flexible 
solutions to legal problems, thereby making them better able to meet 
the needs of parties in conflict. Training future jurists to consider 
legal problems from a multitude of lenses arguably makes them 
more adept at imagining a multiplicity of creative ways to solve 
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parties’ problems without resorting to litigation. As a result, I be-
lieve that this approach to legal thinking will help jurists solve legal 
problems through the alternative forms of dispute resolution they are 
increasingly being encouraged, or in some cases mandated, to use. 
3. Novel Judicial Methodology 
A final justification supporting the growing importance of the trans-
systemic approach is that it dovetails with a novel form of judicial method-
ology developing in Canada and perhaps elsewhere in the world. In Canada, 
we are witnessing an increase in the use of comparative law in our courts 
and a resulting cross-fertilization of ideas moving between the civil and 
common law traditions. This, of course, resonates with an integrated ap-
proach to legal education and its focus on learning from the other. 
Canada is, of course, a bijural country because of the presence 
of the French civil law tradition, which applies in private law matters 
in the province of Quebec, and the English common law tradition 
characteristic of the rest of Canada. The relationship between Que-
bec civil law and Canadian common law is a complicated one in 
which there have been large swings of the pendulum over Canada’s 
150-year history. As I explain in more detail in another article pub-
lished in the Journal of Civil Law Studies, one can trace three major 
trends that define this complex inter-tradition relationship.80 
The first discernable trend, apparent in the years immediately fol-
lowing the creation of the Supreme Court in 1875, was one of harmoni-
zation or unification. As a result, even though the Quebec Act of 1774 
and the division of powers in the Constitution allowed Quebec to main-
tain its civilian tradition in private law, it was sometimes unclear whether 
this tradition would be preserved.81 In particular, the Supreme Court’s 
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early jurisprudence speaks to standardizing and unifying Canadian law 
in a way that would bring the civil and common law in line with each 
other, but, in practice, this meant making the civil law conform to the 
common law, a process that would have left little autonomy for Quebec’s 
civilian legal tradition.82  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, a decidedly different trend 
emerged, that of diversity or autonomy. This was led primarily by Supreme 
Court Justice Pierre-Basile Mignault, who believed that the civil law, being 
part of Quebec’s ancestral heritage, needed to be protected at all costs.83 
Worried about the survival of the civilian tradition in Canada, and even cast-
ing a worried eye to Louisiana, Justice Mignault stressed the distinc-
tiveness of the civil law and argued that it needed to be developed 
autonomously from common law influences in order to preserve the 
tradition’s identity, originality, and integrity.84 
In Canada today, we find elements of both unification and diver-
sification philosophies. On the one hand, we see our Supreme Court 
speaking, in some very recent cases, of the desirability of a conver-
gence in outcome between civil and common law cases of the same 
sort. For example, in a recent case from Quebec dealing with the 
parties’ request to rectify a contract on the basis that the written 
terms did not match their true intentions, the Court refused to do so, 
basing itself on Civil Code principles but also saying that the same 
result would occur in the common law and that that made sense.85 
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On the other hand, we cannot deny that in Canada, we view the 
civil and common law traditions as autonomous and independent, 
the Supreme Court recently asserting that “the common law and the 
civil law [should] evolve side by side, while each maintain[s] its 
distinctive character.”86 This idea came through loud and clear in a 
2014 decision where the Supreme Court had to interpret the statute 
governing the appointment of Supreme Court justices. The Court’s 
interpretation actually resulted in different rules for the appointment 
of the three judges from Quebec that sit on the country’s highest 
court. The majority of the Supreme Court justified this difference by 
explaining that the wording of the statute was due to a historical 
compromise intended to “guarantee that a significant proportion of 
the judges would be drawn from institutions linked to Quebec civil 
law and culture,” and that the law must remain as such since, “the 
objective of ensuring representation from Quebec’s distinct juridical 
tradition remains no less compelling today.”87  
Nonetheless, despite the strong survival of the civilian tradition 
in Canada, existing side by side with its common law counterpart, 
we are currently witnessing a greater willingness among judges to 
look to the other legal tradition in their judicial reasoning, leading 
to an interesting cross-fertilization of ideas. This increasing empha-
sis on comparative law at the judicial level is creating a new trend 
that can be described as one of inspiration. This trend is based on 
the premise that the Court can look across traditions, not to unify 
them but, rather, to use comparative law as inspiration for legal de-
velopment. This maintains the distinctiveness and integrity of the 
two traditions, while at the same time acknowledging the mutual in-
fluence they can have on each other. This inspiration philosophy 
was summed up by Justice Stevenson in Canadian National Railway 
Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. as follows, 
[T]his Court has the benefit of being the final court of appeal 
in a country that has two legal traditions: the English 
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common law and the French civil law. Our two legal tradi-
tions are independent and should not be confused. Concepts 
and solutions found in one tradition should not be imposed 
on the other tradition. But this does not mean that there is no 
place for comparative law on this Court.88 
What is very reassuring about this inspiration movement is that 
it is reciprocal. Not only, as we might expect, are judges in civil law 
cases looking to the common law for inspiration but increasingly, 
the dialogue is moving in the other direction as well with common 
law judges looking to the civil law for inspiration. A notable exam-
ple is when, in November 2014, the Supreme Court rendered a de-
cision using the well-established obligation of good faith that exists 
in Quebec civil law to influence the Court’s creation of a good faith 
duty in contract performance in Canadian common law.89 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The dialectic theme of learning from the other, the very basis of 
the transsystemic approach, is evident in Colonel Tucker’s own 
writings. His words from a 1957 article, published in the Louisiana 
Law Review entitled, “The Role of the Law School in Law Reform,” 
were prescient indeed.90 According to Tucker, “[t]he horizon of le-
gal research today is international. Scholars of the world are con-
stantly exchanging ideas and the experience and practices of other 
countries in solving legal problems are of great assistance in the so-
lution of similar questions at home.”91 Of course, Tucker was speak-
ing about the cross-fertilization of ideas as between scholars but it 
is not such a stretch to say it is equally positive when practiced by 
judges. 
This trend of cross-fertilization and inspiration amongst legal 
traditions mirrors that endorsed by the transsystemic approach, 
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which emphasizes “the encounter between legal traditions,”92 the 
“experience of exchange”93 and “cross-cultural dialogue.”94 Jurists 
educated in a transsystemic environment will be more at home in a 
legal environment that extols learning from, and being inspired by, 
the other. 
It has now come time to end our voyage. I will do so by referring 
to others who have also used a travel metaphor. For one, Marcel 
Proust has famously said that, “[t]he real voyage of discovery con-
sists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.” I have 
always thought that that is what transsystemic thinking seeks to do, 
namely, view existing landscapes through new eyes, apply new 
lenses to legal problems and be enriched by new perspectives. But I 
was delighted to see that John Tucker himself employed this meta-
phor when he stated:  
May we always travel the road of law reform and law revi-
sion together in complete mutual faith and understanding. 
The road ahead has no end and is not without its difficulties. 
But beyond each crest of achievement lies the glittering chal-
lenge of still another task, another problem arising out of the 
evolution and growth of the law to solve.95 
He concludes, as will I, by saying, “[h]ow these problems are to 
be solved depends in large measure upon the leadership of the law 
schools.”96 I believe that McGill has taken a leadership role in re-
casting legal education and, more importantly, legal thinking at 
large. The experiment, which had its risks, has been a success. Tra-
dition-based silos have been replaced by a holistic, integrated ap-
proach. Our students are not prisoners of categories. They are indeed 
legally agnostic. But most importantly, they are open to a myriad of 
ideas and solutions and this approach dovetails closely with the kind 
of lives our graduates will live today as jurists.  
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Just as la Beauce and le Bayou are different places with different 
geographical features, so too are Quebec and Louisiana different le-
gal jurisdictions. However, they are, as we saw earlier, in many 
ways, sister jurisdictions, sharing a common mixity in their legal 
systems. This makes law schools in Louisiana a particularly fertile 
environment in which to showcase this unique itinerary and I am so 
happy you came along with me on this voyage.  
 
